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'unconscious inferences' and general logical tendencies of popular psychology. Wundt has shown conclusively that a great many illusions can be explained as visual assimilations, whose physiological conditions are fixation and movement of regard. On the other hand, while I do not doubt that many other illusions are really 'associative,' due to the conscious arousal of associated visual ideas, I cannot find the concepts of 'approximation' and 'contrast' entirely satisfactory. Color contrast, which Wundt instances in connection with them, is, surely, a different thing altogether; it is, as Hering and his pupils have sufficiently shown, a matter of sensation, of physiological changes at the periphery. The 'law of relativity' is too vague to account for the details of illusion.¹ Perhaps it may be possible, by continued investigation, to find a working physiological hypothesis for the outlying group of facts. In any case, the incompleteness of Wundt's account seems preferable, in the present state of psychological knowledge, to the over-adequacy or 'tautology' of Lipps' theory.²

E. B. T.

- (68) *Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie*. MAX DESOIR. 2^e Auflage, 1^{er} Halbband, pp. 356. Carl Duncker, Berlin, 1897.

One volume only of Dr. Dessoir's history has appeared (1894). We now have this volume, or a part of it, in second edition. Criticism of the earlier output confessed to the author's great diligence in covering an immense mass of literature, for the most part now dead, but pointed out serious defects in matter and in arrangement. The new edition, "eine völlig neue Bearbeitung des Gegenstands," calls for careful scrutiny and evaluation.

The plan of the work shows major changes in matter and form. A new introduction on ancient, mediæval and recent psychology, and a bibliography are affixed. The author's profession of an invariable use of primary sources in the modern period is a timely defense against the charge of inaccuracy. Lengthy citations are avoided and there is an evident effort to shun prolixity. Fuller treatment of the psychology of the last century has crowded out the more constructive part of the first edition, the part of most doubtful value. For the revision of this we must wait.

In Part I, named "Die Begründung der deutschen Psychologie," are sections on Leibniz, Thomasius, Wolff, his followers and opponents, and eclectics. The systems of Leibniz and Wolff have been reconsidered and their essentials presented in much more comprehensive form, while Rüdiger and Crusius, two chief opponents of Wolff, are allowed freer utterance. Nearly double the space has been allotted this division. Part II occupies two-thirds of the volume and gives the development of the "Erfahrungsseelenlehre" in Germany from 1750 to 1800. The corresponding part of the first

¹To be concrete. Suppose that it could be shown that the estimation of the central circles in Ebbinghaus' figures is explicable (say in terms of energy of movement; cf. Wundt's explanation as regards acute and obtuse angles) as an absolute illusion; that the one circle is overestimated, the other underestimated, whether the two figures are given together or not. The contrast illusion would, of course, follow: but it would not be due to the juxtaposition of the two figures, the interrelation of perceptions, but rather to the pre-existence of physiological (assimilative) motives to illusion in each figure. The psychological 'contrast' would thus be reduced to perceptual processes with an intelligible physical substrate. In the meantime, Loeb's assertion of a space-contrast and attribution of space-values to the retinal elements ('space' being on a par with 'color,' *e. g.*) must remain wholly unconvincing to psychologists. Herbartian or other (see *Zeitsch.*, xvi, p. 298).

²Some of Wundt's statements as to motives to illusion appear, in the light of Lipps' work, to be too sweeping: see the critique of Lipps' theory above. But the necessary modifications can easily be made, without prejudice to the general standpoint.

edition brought the history down to 1780, but was again much more fragmentary than this. Revision and improvement are everywhere prominent. Much more space is devoted to historical summary, and classification is less forced than before. 'Scholastic,' 'natural science,' 'popular' and 'analytic,' are clearly more significant psychological rubrics for the period than 'materialistic' and 'anti-materialistic.' The new arrangement permits tardy justice in many cases, as, e. g., Lossius and Irwing, who are rightly termed physiological instead of materialistic psychologists. Foreign influences are taken more carefully into account, though the evident importance of the English empiricists to the eighteenth century psychology of experience is not made prominent. Especially Locke, to whose distinction of inner and outer perception the "Erfahrungsseelenlehre" owes so much, deserves more attention. Only a half page of generalization is given.

It would be quite useless to profess in this connection a detailed criticism of the summary and evaluation which Dr. Dessoir has undertaken at large, but, failing in this, a somewhat close scrutiny of a bit chosen from the whole and focused with care may do justice to the workmanship of the entire piece. Take, for instance, the work of L. H. Jakob, one of the more important of the lesser men. The system gains in importance by being a titled "Erfahrungsseelenlehre" from the end of the century, the psychology whose development consumes a large part of the book. D.'s discussion of the work under the heading "Assoziationspsychologie" does it doubtful justice, while it obscures its value as a treatise on empirical or experience psychology. And D.'s caveat against confusing this trend with English associationism scarcely justifies the disposition. The "Methodologische Richtung" and the "Vorliebe für begriffliche Zergliederungen," which writers of this class show, seem rather to relate them to the analysts. D. makes Tetens' "Philosophische Versuche" (1777) the culmination of the empirical trend of the last century. Jakob's system, written fourteen years later, marks an advance in "Erfahrungsseelenlehre." While it professes to be psychology of the inner sense, it gives an important place to physiology (e. g., 4th ed., pp. 6 and 215), and inserts in the "Physiology of the Human Mind" a discussion of the phenomena of the outer sense in parallel with a discussion of the inner. Empirical psychology has evidently come to mean more than a "pure psychology of internal perception which * * * completely disregarded the physical conditions of mental phenomena" (Kölpe, *Introd. to Phil.*, trans., p. 61). J.'s prime distinction of inner and outer sense is neglected by D. The inner sense is reviewed in two sentences which throw no light on its significance. The first half of the book is better summarized than the last. The more complex faculties are slighted, the method of classification of desires is given incompletely, and the relation of desire to instinct and passion is omitted. Finally, there is no reference made to the contents of the second part of the work on the "Pathology of the Human Mind." On the other hand all of the citations from Jakob are verified, and, in the main, are well chosen. If one may judge the detail of the whole by this fraction, one would be inclined to say that the factual reproduction is correct and of unequivocal value. This is of especial importance to Americans, to whom much of Dr. Dessoir's source-material is not available. I will only add that practically all of the minor errors of the first edition, brought out by detailed criticism, stand corrected in the new volume.